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Chapter 43 Bans Discrimination in Jury Selection Based on
Sexual Orientation: Will it Really Prevent Attorneys From
Excusing Unwanted Prospective Jurors?
Jennifer Stewart McGeorge*

Code Sections Affected
Code of Civil Procedure § § 231.5 (new); 204 (amended).
AB 2418 (Migden); 2000 STAT. Ch. 43

Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligibleforjury service are
to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual
ratherthan a group or class matter Thatfact lies at the very heart of the
jury system. To disregardit is to open the door to [group]distinctions and
discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by
jury.,
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I. INTRODUCTION

Ironically, in an era where the public eagerly tries to avoid jury service, 2 most
attorneys do not prioritize a prospective juror's desire to fulfill her civic duty.3
Instead, many attorneys relish their ability to remove prospective jurors from jury
panels, 4 citing arbitrary and sometimes laughable reasons for doing so. 5 However,
challenged jurors do not often share the sentiment of lawyers, and frequently
become angry and frustrated upon dismissal from a jury panel.6 Such frustration is
especially common when an excused prospective juror is a member of an
identifiable group, "distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds,"7
and he suspects that the dismissal from service was based solely on such
membership. 8 Even more problematic is the fact that criminal defendants who are
members of the same group as the excluded juror may be tried by juries deliberately
deprived of representatives from their own community. 9 Unfortunately, members of
the homosexual community have often been the victims of discriminatory jury
selection procedures in California.' ° As a result, Chapter 43 is a legislative attempt
2.
See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges: Lawyers Are from Mars, Judges Are from Venus, 3
GREEN BAG 2d 135, 137 (2000) (suggesting that most people try to get excused from jury duty); see also Editorial,
CourtingGay Rights, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 2000, at A24 [hereinafter Courting Gay Rights] (same).
3. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 137 (commenting that attorneys often excuse jurors who are comfortable
with serving on a jury).
4.
See id.at 136 (claiming that, "[i]f you are a trial lawyer, you would sooner dispense with a few
amendments to the Constitution than give up peremptory challenges").
5.
See, e.g., Paul R. Lynd, Comment, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement,
Privacy, Challengesfor Cause, and Peremptories,46 UCLA L. REV. 231,281-82 (1998) (claiming that attorneys
can excuse persons from jury service for reasons that "can be as individualized as counsel and can be stereotypical,
peculiar, and capricious"); see also infra text accompanying notes 147-48 (explaining that permissible peremptory
strikes include excusing a juror from service because she is a "wide-eyed blonde"' or because she may resemble
one of the attorney's relatives).
6.
Hoffman, supra note 2, at 137.
7. Infra note 35 and accompanying text.
8.
See infra text accompanying notes 101-02 (asserting that excluding gays from juries sends a message
that they are not equal members of society and are unfit for jury service).
9. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that this practice is a violation of a defendant's equal protection rights).
10. CAROLE MIGDEN, AB 2418 JURORS-ELIGIBILITY, 1 (2000) [hereinafter MIGDEN, JURORS-ELIGIBILITY]
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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to ensure that California's attorneys do not commit such discrimination during jury
selection in the Golden State."
Chapter 43 limits the use of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges by
preventing the exclusion of homosexuals and other identifiable groups from jury
2
service based solely on group membership. 1 Instead of tailoring its provisions to the
homosexual community alone, however, the Legislature drafted Chapter 43 to
include other identifiable groups as well, so that no individual community is
afforded special treatment. 3 Supporters of Chapter 43 argue that the new law
provides consistency between California statutory law and both state and federal
constitutional provisions.' 4 Advocates also claim that Chapter 43 prevents
5
homosexuals from the stigma they suffer during jury selection. Opponents, on the
other hand, argue that attorneys should have the right to exclude homosexuals and
6
other identifiable groups from jury service.' They claim that members of the
homosexual community, specifically, may have predetermined biases in cases
involving gay issues. 17 Furthermore, there may be significant consequences
8
associated with limiting an attorney's use of peremptory challenges.'
In sum, even though Chapter 43 is intended to prevent discrimination in jury
selection based on group bias, the new law is unlikely to change the ability of
9
attorneys to remove unwanted prospective jurors from service.1 Furthermore,
because Chapter 43 fails to specify a remedy for courts to follow upon discovery of
an improperly dismissed juror, unforseen20consequences could undermine the very
purpose behind Chapter 43's enactment.

11. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons that Chapter 43 was enacted).
12. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204 (amended by Chapter 43) (banning the exclusion of certain groups from
jury service based on "occupation, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status, or sexual orientation");
see also id. § 231.5 (enacted by Chapter 43) (omitting occupation and economic status from the above list, but
banning the use of peremptory challenges to excuse members of the remaining groups based solely on group
membership).
13.

See CAROLE MIGDEN, AB 2418 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, 1 (2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge

Law Review) [hereinafter MIGDEN Q & A] (noting that Chapter 43 includes other identifiable groups in its coverage
because including only homosexuals would provide gays and lesbians with greater protection than other identifiable
groups otherwise).
14. Infra Part V.A.
15. Infra Part IV.A.
16. Infra Part IV.B.
17. Infra Part IV.B.
18. infra Part V.C.
19. Infra Part IV.D.I.
20. Infra Part IV.D.2.
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II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Voir Dire Process: Priorand Existing Law
In a process commonly referred to as voir dire, prospective jurors are
examined by the court, and the attorneys for each side, in an attempt to uncover any
potential predisposed bias.22 During this examination, attorneys are permitted to
exercise two types of challenges to remove prospective jurors from service:
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.23
Prior California statutory law forbade the exemption of prospective jurors from
jury service only if such exemption was based solely on "occupation, race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, economic status, or for any other reason. 24 Subject to
these and one other limitation imposed by Chapter 43,25 existing law provides that
attorneys may still challenge prospective jurors "for cause" if such juror meets
specific statutory criteria.2 6
Once all challenges for cause have been executed by each side, an attorney may
further excuse certain jurors 27 that she believes to be biased without giving an
explanation2 8 This lack of required explanation, in fact, is the very essence of the
peremptory challenge.2 9 However, unlike challenges for cause, each side's exercise
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "'voir dire"' as follows: "[tlo speak the
truth. This phrase denotes the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys make of prospective jurors
to determine their qualification and suitability to serve as jurors. Peremptory challenges or challenges for cause may
result from such examination").
22. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 222.5 (West Supp. 2000).
23. Id.
24. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1245, sec. 2, at 4144 (enacting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204).
25. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §204 (amended by Chapter 43) (adding sexual orientation to the list ofgroups
that may not be exempted from jury service).
26. See id. § 229 (West Supp. 2000) (noting that existing California law provides that a prospective juror
may be excused "for cause" if she shows evidence of any of the following: close affinity (within the fourth degree)
to any party; having any type of familial, business or fiduciary relationship to any party; having served as a juror
or witness in a previous trial involving the same parties or the same cause of action; having a specific interest in the
action (excluding an interest as a taxpayer); having a predetermined opinion on the merits of the case based upon
knowledge of material facts; having bias; being a party to another action set for trial in the same court; or in a
criminal case, having beliefs which would preclude such juror from finding a defendant guilty where the death
penalty may be imposed).
27. See id. § 226(c) (West Supp. 2000) (stating that, "[a]ll challenges for cause shall be exercised before any
peremptory challenges may be exercised") (emphasis added).
28. See id. § 226(b) (West Supp. 2000) (indicating that peremptories are challenges made by attorneys
excusing jurors from ajury panel for which no reason need be given); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)
(same); John F. McEldowney, Standbyfor the Crown: An HistoricalAnalysis,1979 CRIM. L. REV. 272,274 (1979)
(same); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discriminationin Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 725, 762 (1992) (same); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
peremptory challenges in part as, "[t]he right to challenge ajuror without assigning, or being required to assign, a
reason for the challenge"). But see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274,583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
901 (1978) (conceding that although no reason must be stated in the exercise of a peremptory challenge, "it does
not follow therefrom that it is an objection for which no reason need exist").
29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (defining "peremptory challenges").
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of peremptory challenges is limited to a certain number.3 ° Once that number is
exhausted, the remaining jurors on the panel must be seated and sworn.3'
B. Jury Selection Procedures:ConstitutionalConcerns Expressed in Case Law
Beyond the statutory restrictions placed upon jury selection procedures in
California, both state and federal case law have also addressed the issue of improper
exclusion of prospective jurors from jury service.32 California courts have
emphasized that excluding prospective jurors who are members of "cognizable
groups" violates both the state and federal Constitution's "fair cross section"
requirement. 33 The United States Supreme Court, however, has based its decisions
in this arena on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.34
1. CaliforniaCase Law: "FairCross Section" Violations
Discrimination injury selection based solely on a potential juror's membership
in a "cognizable group" has been forbidden by California case law for over two
decades.35 In People v. Wheeler,36 the California Supreme court held that when
potential jurors are excluded from service simply because of their membership in a
particular group, such bias "violates [a defendant's] right to trial by a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community. '37 The court pointed out that
this "cross-section" requirement is implicit in both the state and federal

30. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231 (a)-(b) (West Supp. 2000) (explaining that in California, for criminal
cases punishable by death or life imprisonment, each side is limited to twenty peremptory challenges); id. (noting
that for all other criminal offenses each side is limited to ten peremptory challenges, except those offenses
punishable by incarceration for ninety days or less, where each side is limited to six peremptories); see also id.
§ 231(c) (West Supp. 2000) (limiting peremptory challenges in California civil cases to six for each side).
31. id. § 231(e) (West Supp. 2000).
32. See infraPart ll.B.1 (discussing some California case law that has addressed this issue); infra Part II.B.3
(same); see also infra Part n.B.2 (discussing federal case law that has addressed this issue).

33. InfraPartll.B.l.
34. lnfra Part II.B.2.
35. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (holding that potential jurors may
not be excluded from jury service, "merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on
racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds," but failing to specify a test to determine whether a group falls within
the definition of "identifiable"). The court used the term "cognizable" interchangeably with "identifiable"
throughout the case. Recognizing that it set out no test for determining which groups qualify as "cognizable," the
court explained that, "[b]ecause there can be no doubt that the blacks in the present case constitute a cognizable
group for such purpose, we have no occasion to explore the point further at this time." Id. at 280 n. 26, 583 P.2d
at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
36. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
37. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
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constitutions, 38 and simply is a means of composing a fair and impartial jury. 39
Specifically, the cross-section requirement necessitates that jurors be drawn from a
"body truly representative of the community." 40 Therefore, the court reasoned that
when potential jurors are excused by attorneys based on group bias, 4' the resulting
jury pool is not an accurate sample of the community at large; and thus, the entire
jury selection process is constitutionally deficient.4 2
Although the Wheeler case clarified that discrimination against "cognizable
43
groups" in jury selection is unconstitutional, the court left the term undefined.
Therefore, in a second case, Rubio v. SuperiorCourt,44 the California Supreme court
created a two-part test for determining what groups fall within the "cognizable"
realm. 45 First, the group's members "must share a common perspective arising from
their life experience in the group," and, second, "no other members of the
community [may be] capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group
46
assertedly excluded.

2. The United States Supreme Court: Equal Protection Violations
Subsequent to the California cases discussed above, the United States Supreme
Court similarly applied the "cognizable group" concept in holding that race is an
38. See id. at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900 (asserting that even though the United States
and California Constitutions do not specifically contain the "fair cross-section"' language, both the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article One, section sixteen, of the California Constitution require that
juries be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community). But see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 1994) (using specific
language referring to the fair 'cross-section' requirement, stating that, "[i]t is the policy of the United States that
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random
from afair cross section ofthe community in the district or division wherein the court convenes") (emphasis added).
39. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896 (stating that one of the many
beliefs underlying the fair cross-section requirement is that "the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality
is to encourage the representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their
members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out"). The court also pointed out that
the fair cross-section rule "serves other essential functions in our society, such as legitimizing the judgments of the
courts, promoting citizen participation in government, and preventing further stigmatizing of minority groups." Id.
at 267 n. 6, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896; see also People v. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1277, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 339, 344 (2000) (arguing that the purpose of the cross-section requirement is to produce jurors with diverse
viewpoints); Teri Sforza, JurorsCan'tBe Barredfor Sexual Orientation:The Ruling Stems From an 0. C. Burglary
Trial, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 2, 2000, at B04 (same).
40. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
4 1. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (1978) (defining "group bias" as
"when a party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds ... and peremptorily strikes all such persons for that
reason alone").
42. Id. at 271-72, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
43. Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
44. 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
45. Id. at 97-98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (indicating that although the process of defining a
"cognizable group" began in a previous 1974 case, the test is clarified by the Rubio court).
46. Id. at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
47. Supra Part Il.B. 1.
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impermissible criterion for excluding prospective jurors from jury service.48 In
Batson v. Kentucky,49 the Court held that excluding prospective jurors based solely
on racial grounds violated the Equal Protection clause of the United States
Constitution.5 ° The Court reasoned that racial discrimination in jury selection
deprived a similarly situated defendant of the protection a jury trial is intended to
provide.5 ' A jury panel is intended to be composed of one's peers-namely, those
who are of the same societal status as the defendant.52 Therefore, the deliberate
exclusion of prospective jurors of the same racial composition as the defendant fails
53
to protect such a defendant against racial discrimination in jury deliberations. As
the Supreme Court once noted, "[i]t is well known that prejudices often exist against
particular [races] in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which,
therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those [races] the full
enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy., 54 However, not every jury must
include members of the defendant's race,55 nor must representatives of each societal
group serve on every jury.56 Rather, the Batson Court explained that prospective
jurors may not be purposefully excluded from jury service based solely on a juror's
race if the jury selection process is to have constitutional validity.57
Shortly after Batson, the United States Supreme Court forbade gender
discrimination injury selection as well.58 In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., the Court
extended the Batson rationale to gender, stating that, "[d]iscrimination in jury
selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants... by the
risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will
infect the entire proceedings. ' 59 The Court also discussed the need to remedy the
centuries of past discrimination suffered by women through their complete exclusion
from the judicial process.60 Mainly, the Court reasoned that prospective jurors

48.
49.

Infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).

50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 86.
52. See id. (explaining the idea behind a jury trial); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1879) (same).
53. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting the reasoning of Strauder v. West Virginia which stated that
"[tihose on the venire must be 'indifferently chosen,' to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to 'protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice').
54. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85; see Lynd, supra note 5, at 240 (explaining that no party to a trial is entitled to
a particular jury composition).
56. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86 n. 6; see also Lynd, supra note 5, at 240 (explaining that juries do not need
to have a particular composition).
57. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
58. Infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
59. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
60. See generally id. at 131-38 (explaining the various activities in which women were excluded from
participation throughout the history of the United States).
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should not automatically be "presumed unqualified" forjury service simply because
of their gender.6
3.

People v. Garcia: The Homosexual Community Is a "Cognizable" Group

In a recent California case, the homosexual community was also held to
constitute a "cognizable group" under the Wheeler and Rubio standards.62 In People
v. Garcia,63 the court determined that the gay community fulfills the first part of the
Rubio test, because they share a "common perspective" as a result of their life
experience as homosexuals. 64 The court noted that:
It cannot seriously be argued in this era of "don't ask; don't tell" that
homosexuals do not have a common perspective-"a common social or
psychological outlook on human events"-based upon their membership in
that community. They share a history of persecution comparable to that of
Blacks and women.65
Furthermore, the court went on to explain that homosexuals also share a common
perspective because they have spent their lives as part of a minority group, fearful
66
of being stigmatized by society. *
Once the court established that the gay community shares a common
perspective, the court explained why that perspective cannot be represented by any
group other than the homosexual community. 67 The court reasoned that the second
part of the Rubio test is satisfied because the past discrimination suffered by
homosexuals is only comprehendible by members of their own community. 68 To
illustrate its point, the court cited a 1998 poll showing that 17.1% of prospective
jurors admitted a bias toward homosexuals that would preclude them from being fair
if chosen as part of a jury venire where one of the parties was gay or lesbian. 69 These
statistics are significantly higher than those measuring bias against AfricanAmericans and women. 70 Thus, the court concluded that the gay community suffers

61. Id. at 142.
62. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1281,92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
63. 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (2000).
64. Id. at 1276, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
68. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1279, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
69. Id. at 1279 n.7, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346; see also Lynd, supra note 5, at 273 (indicating that at least one
court has dismissed jurors for cause because they demonstrated actual bias by admitting that they could not be fair
to a homosexual victim).
70. See Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1279 n.7, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346 (asserting that within the same pool
of prospective jurors "only 4.8 percent did not think they could be fair to African-Americans, and 5 percent did not
think they could be fair to women").
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an insurmountable level of discrimination, supplying them with a unique perspective
that deserves representation on a jury venire.7 1
III. CHAPTER 43
The enactment of Chapter 43 is a legislative attempt to codify an entire body of
state and federal case law holding that members of identifiable groups may not be
excluded fromjury service on the basis of group membership alone. 2 Credited with74
73
instigating Chapter 43's creation are two recent court decisions: People v. Garcia
and Wade v. Terhune. 5 First, because the landmark Garcia decision was made by
the Fourth District California Court of Appeals, it is only applicable to Orange
County. 76 Therefore, Assemblymember Carole Migden believed that its holding
needed codification in order to establish state law uniformity.7 7 Secondly, Migden
argued that Chapter 43's enactment was particularly necessary because the federal
court in Terhune claimed that California state courts were not adequately applying
the law under Batson.78 Therefore, even though both federal and state case law
already forbid exclusion of prospective jurors based solely on group bias, Chapter
43's supporters believed that statutory action was necessary in order to send courts
a clear legislative message that discrimination against identifiable groups during jury
selection is unacceptable.79

71. Id. at 1279, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
72. See MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 2-3 (explaining that Chapter 43 codifies Wheeler, Batson, and all
of the other cases that led up to the Garciadecision); see also SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 2418, at 6 (June 14, 2000) (same).
73. Infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
74. 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (2000).
75. 202 F.3d 1190 (2000).
76. Jenifer Warren, Californiaand the West: New Law BarsAnti-Gay Bias in Jury Selection, L.A. TIMES,
June 28, 2000, at A3.
77. Id.
78. See MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 2 (stating that
California State courts are not sufficiently enforcing Batson and consequently, Californians are being
kept off of juries because of occupation, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status... [C]ourts need guidance in code on assuring that no prospective juror is kept off a jury due to
[any of these reasons]. [Chapter 43] attempts to provide that guidance);
see also Terhune, 202 F.3d at 1196-97 (stating that since 1994 "the California state courts have applied a lower
standard of scrutiny to peremptory strikes than the federal Constitution permits"). The Terhune court went on to
explain that under People v. Wheeler, the constitutional standard was defined as mandating a showing of "strong
likelihood" that jurors were excused based on group bias, whereas the standard under Batson v. Kentucky requires
a showing of a "reasonable inference." Id. at 1195-96. Batson, however, is the controlling case law. Id. at 1197.
79. See Carole Migden, Governor Davis Signs Migden Bill to Codify Decision Calling Lesbians and Gays
"Cognizable" Group, News Release 209, June 27, 2000, at I (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(quoting Assemblymember Carole Migden stating that Chapter 43 "'assures that no one will be denied the right of
serving on ajury and assures that all segments of society have a place in the jury box'); Letter from Wendy Taylor,
Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, to Assemblymember Carole Migden, at I (Apr. 19,
2000) [hereinafter Taylor Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (asserting that Chapter 43 sends
a message that discrimination in jury selection will not be tolerated); Letter from Barry Broad and Shane Gusman,
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Specifically, Chapter 43 focuses on ensuring that homosexuals are not deprived
of the right to serve on juries. 8° Prior to Chapter 43, the California Code of Civil
Procedure protected some cognizable groups from automatic exemption from jury
service, but did not expressly protect individuals from exemption based solely on
sexual orientation. 8 Even worse, the code provided a legal loophole to the above
statute by failing to specifically ban such discrimination in an attorney's use of
peremptory challenges.82 With the enactment of Chapter 43, the Legislature
proposes a solution to these problems. 83 First, Chapter 43 adds sexual orientation to
the list of unacceptable reasons for automatically exempting a potential juror from
jury service.84 Secondly, the new law bans attorneys from using peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors based solely on such person's membership
in a "cognizable" group.85
Chapter 43 also attempts to assure that California law is consistent with both
state and federal constitutional provisions.8 6 For example, the Legislature declared
that because gays and lesbians are considered a "cognizable segment of the
community,, 87 they must be included in the jury pool in order to preserve "the
constitutional concept of [a] jury trial. 88 In other words, when homosexuals are
excluded from jury service, the panel is deprived of exposure to unique

California Public Defenders Association, to All Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, at I (May 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Broad Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (same); Letter from Francisco Lobaco,
Legislative Director, and Valerie Small Navarro, Legislative Advocate, American Civil Liberties Union, to
Assemblymember Carole Migden, at I (Apr. 19,2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (same); Letter
from Eric-Joseph C. Astacaan, Legislative Advocate, California Alliance for Pride and Equality, to
Assemblymember Carole Migden, at 1 (Apr. 18,2000) (copy on file with theMcGeorge LawReview) (same); Letter
from Karen Jo Koonan, National Jury Project, to Assemblymember Carole Migden, at 1 (Apr. 13, 2000) [hereinafter
Koonan Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (same); Don Thompson, Law EstablishesGay-Juror
Rights: Davis Signs Landmark Legislation That Bars Panelistsfrom Being Removed Solely Because of Sexual
Orientation, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 28, 2000, at A04 (same); Overmyer, A Fair and Impartial Jury,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 21, 2000 [hereinafter Overmyer Article] (same).
80. See 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 43, sec. 1(5), at 138 (declaring that the gay community, "deserve[s] to bear
their share of the burdens and benefits of citizenship, including jury service").
81. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204 (West Supp. 2001) (amended by Chapter 43) (listing occupation, race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, and economic status as the classifications for which potential jurors may not
be exempted from jury service but neglecting to include sexual orientation).
82. See MIGDEN,JURORS-ELIGIBILITY, supra note 10, at I (explaining that there was no prior code provision
pertaining to this issue before the passage of Chapter 43).
83. See infra notes 84-85 (explaining the proposed solutions).
84. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 204 (amended by Chapter 43) (adding sexual orientation to the existing list
banning the exclusion of potential jurors based on occupation, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and
economic status).
85. See id. § 231.5 (enacted by Chapter 43) (listing "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, sexual
orientation, or similar grounds" as impermissible grounds for a peremptory strike); see also MIGDEN Q & A, supra
note 13 (explaining that Chapter 43 covers all cognizable groups rather than covering only homosexuals because
gays and lesbians would have more protection than other cognizable groups otherwise).
86. Infra text accompanying notes 87-89, 92.
87. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 43, sec. 1(3), at 138.
88. Id., sec. 1(2), at 138.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 32
perspectives, 89 which conflicts with both the state and federal constitutional
requirement of drawing potential jurors from a "fair cross-section" of the
community. 90 Additionally, Chapter 43 addresses the equal protection concerns
expressed in federal case law. 9' By precluding exclusion of homosexual prospective
jurors based on group bias alone, Chapter 43 seeks to ensure that homosexual
defendants are not denied their equal protection right of having a jury composed of
similarly situated persons.92
Unfortunately, however, Chapter 43 does not provide a specific remedy upon
discovery that a juror is being excused from a panel based solely on impermissible
bias.93 Instead, courts are expected to apply case law in order to determine the
appropriate remedy.94 Although Chapter 43 does not codify the Legislative intent
regarding this matter, apparently lawmakers intend for courts to seat the improperly
excused juror in the event an attorney gives an inadequate explanation for the
prospective juror's dismissal, rather than excuse the entire panel. 95

89.

See id., sec. 1(1), (3), at 138 (explaining that because homosexuals share "a common perspective based

upon their membership in that community," removing them from the jury pool prevents, "qualities of human nature
and varieties of human experience" from being considered).
90. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (listing both the California and federal constitutional sources
of the "fair cross-section" requirement).
91. See supra Part 11.B (discussing the Batson and J.E.B. decisions); see also infra text accompanying note
92 (explaining how Chapter 43 addresses the equal protection issue).
92. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204 (amended by Chapter 43) (adding sexual orientation to the list of
impermissible grounds for excluding a prospective juror); id. § 231.5 (enacted by Chapter 43) (creating a list,
including sexual orientation, of impermissible reasons for excusing a prospective juror from jury service); see also
supra Part H.B (discussing that the exclusion of jurors belonging to the same identifiable group as a defendant
violates such defendant's equal protection rights).
93. See MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 3 (commenting that Chapter 43 fails to provide a remedy once
improper dismissal of a prospective juror is discovered).
94. See id. at 2-3 (claiming that Batson and Wheeler discuss different remedies for improper dismissal of
a prospective juror). Assemblymember Migden claims that the remedy under Batson is to seat the juror; whereas,
Wheeler "has been interpreted to provide that the court must throw out the entire panel and start over in jury
selection." Id. See also Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (asserting that upon
discovery of the fact that an attorney has improperly excused ajuror from a venire, the remedy is to excuse the entire
jury panel selected thus far). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24 (commenting in the majority opinion that
we express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of
discrimination against ... jurors, for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from
a panel not previously associated with the case ... or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and
resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire).
95. See MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 3 (quoting Assemblymember Carole Migden stating that instead
of specifically providing a remedy within Chapter 43's provisions, courts can "rely on case law ... allowing the
juror to be seated").
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IV. ANALYSIS

A.

OF CHAPTER

43

The Right to a FairTrial versus The Right to Serve as a Juror:Does Chapter
43 Confuse Priorities?

Perhaps the most obvious argument posed by Chapter 43's supporters is that
the new statutes provide consistency between California law and constitutional
provisions.96 First, supporters contend that Chapter 43 will ensure defendants of
their constitutional right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community.97 For example, by banning the exclusion of members of cognizable
groups from jury service based on group membership alone, Chapter 43 reduces the
likelihood that such discrimination will not occur. 98 Additionally, Chapter 43 allows
defendants the opportunity to secure their equal protection rights by providing that
prospective jurors belonging to the same identifiable group as the defendant may not
be excluded from jury service based solely on group membership. 99
Supporters of Chapter 43 also argue that the new law finally addresses the
stereotypes suffered by the gay community.'00 First of all, when homosexuals are
denied the opportunity to serve on juries, a message is sent that gays are not equal
members of society.'0 ' Such exclusion also perpetuates the stereotype that gays and

96. Infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
97. See Taylor Letter, supra note 79, at I (indicating that Chapter 43 will "help ensure that juries consist of
a true cross-section of the community and further secure to defendants their right to an impartial jury"); Courting
Gay Rights, supra note 2, at A24 (arguing that Chapter 43 will provide diversity among jurors); see also supra text
accompanying note 38 (explaining that the cross-section requirement is rooted in both the California and United
States' Constitutions).
98. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204 (amended by Chapter 43) (noting that once the initial jury pool is
compiled, Chapter 43 prevents attorneys from automatically excluding members of cognizable groups from jury
service based solely on group membership); id. § 231.5 (enacted by Chapter 43) (banning attorneys from using
peremptory challenges to exclude members of identifiable groups from jury service based on group bias alone).
99. See supranote 92 and accompanying text (explaining Chapter 43's provisions preventing discrimination
based on group bias); see also supra text accompanying notes 50-57 (explaining that excluding members of the
same cognizable group as a defendant is inconsistent with the equal protection provisions of the Constitution);
Broad Letter, supra note 79, at I (claiming that "[d]iscrimination in the juror selection process erodes [the] right
[to a fair and impartial jury] by depriving the defendant of a whole class of potential jurors based on certain
characteristics they share").
100. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02 (giving examples of stereotypes suffered by the gay
community, such as being considered unequal members of society and being considered unfit for jury service ).
101. See Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1279, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346 (claiming that exclusion of gay jurors
deprives them of their community membership); Lynd, supra note 5, at 239 (quoting editorial columnist Brian
James, stating that ."[i]f gays can be systematically excluded from A Jury of Your Peers, then we're not really peers.
We're not equal citizens under the law'); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender:Peremptory Challengesand the Roles
ofthe Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1046 (1995) (stating that "jury service ... signifies the political acts of belonging
to a community and participating as a full and equal citizen"); Letter from Steve Birdlebough, Friends Committee
on Legislation of California, to Assemblymember Sheila Kuehl, at 1 (Apr. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Birdlebough
Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (claiming that homosexuals should have the same rights as
other community groups with respect tojury service); Letter from Tom Benbrook, Advocacy Chair, Ventura County
Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, to Assemblymember Carole Migden, at I (Mar. 20, 2000)
[hereinafter Benbrook Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (same); Koonan Letter, supra note 79, at
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lesbians are unfit to serve on juries. 10 2 However, because jury duty is a civic
responsibility, 01 3 homosexuals deserve to contribute to decisions that will
undoubtedly affect them as citizens.'O Otherwise, there is a danger that continued
exclusion from jury service will lessen the gay community's willingness to accept
jury verdicts.'0 5 Thus, Chapter 43 is necessary not only because it broadens the jury
pool to include homosexuals, 106 but also because it manifests the view of lawmakers
that "[n]o Californian should be deprived of the opportunity to share in our system
of justice simply because they are gay or lesbian."' 0 7
In spite of the overwhelming support of Chapter 43, the new law is not without
criticism. 108For example, the Committee on Moral Concerns defines the homosexual
community as a "politically charged, activist minority fighting to advance a sexual
lifestyle that has never been accepted in American history."' 1 9 Therefore, the
Committee argues that homosexuals should be excluded from certain jury trials
because the group may have a "chip on its shoulder."" 0 In sum, the Committee
contends that because the jury system is designed to ensure that defendants will
receive a fair trial, it should not be used to glorify the rights of jurors."'
I (referring to jury service as a "right" that homosexuals have). But see Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61-62
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that we need to be cognizant of the fact that jury selection is intended to
provide defendants with fair and impartial juries and not to glorify the rights of jurors); Letter from Art Croney,
Executive Director/Lobbyist, Committee on Moral Concerns, to Assembly Judiciary Committee, at 1 (Apr. 20,
2000) [hereinafter C.M.C. Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (same).
102. See Jennifer L. Reichert, Gay and Lesbian Jurors Are A Cognizable Group, Appeals Court Rules, TRIAL,
Apr. 2000, at 99 [hereinafter Reichert Article] (quoting a gay rights advocate stating that "a lot of [people]... see
gay and lesbian people as criminals who are psychologically unfit for most roles in society").
103. See Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1279, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346 (claiming that jury duty is a civic
responsibility); Courting Gay Rights, supra note 2, at A24 (same); Chris Burnett, Lawmaker Says Gay-Rights Bills
Will Wait a Year, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 28, 2000 (same).
104. See Warren, supra note 76, at A3 (declaring that supporters of Chapter 43 believe that the new law sends
a message that homosexuals have a valuable contribution to make to civic life); Reichert Article, supra note 102,
at 99 (same).
105. See Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1274-75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342-43 (suggesting that if certain groups
are excluded from jury service, public confidence in the fairness of verdicts is lessened); Marder, supra note 101,
at 1091 (same); see also Hoffman, supra note 2, at 138 (claiming that many jurors who are excused from service
"are leaving our courtrooms with the feeling that the rest of the trial process must be just as bizarre and irrational
as jury selection").
106. Courting Gay Rights, supra note 2, at A24.
107. See Burnett, supra note 103 (quoting Governor Gray Davis).
108. Infra text accompanying notes 109-11, 113-15.
109. C.M.C. Letter, supra note 101, at 1.
110. Id.; see also Warren, supra note 76, at A3 (quoting Art Croney, Executive Director of the Committee
on Moral Concerns, expressing this same sentiment when asked to comment on Chapter 43). But see Overmyer
Article, supra note 79 (rejecting the Committee's argument in stating that it is "precisely the kind of view that must
not be allowed to poison the jury selection").
111. C.M.C. Letter, supra note 101, at 1. Members of the Supreme Court have also expressed this view. See,
e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 61-62 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that limiting a defendant's use of peremptory
challenges in jury selection confuses priorities because in doing so, "we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on
juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces
imprisonment or even death"); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 150 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting the same language of
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Georgia v. McCollum and indicating agreement). But see Garcia,77 Cal.
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B. Do Homosexual JurorsHave PredeterminedBiases in Cases Involving Gay
Issues?

The Traditional Values Coalition also presents arguments in opposition to
Chapter 4 3 .'12 First, the Coalition claims that Chapter 43 "seeks to merely add13
weight" to the homosexual community by classifying them as a cognizable group.
The Coalition further asserts that Chapter 43 is unnecessary because it simply adds
a group's sexual preference to an existing list of classifications. 1 4 The Coalition's
most contested argument, however, is that if sexual orientation was an issue
involved in a trial, Chapter 43 allows excused homosexual prospective jurors to
claim discrimination "when in fact they obviously
had a predetermined position on
' 5
mind."
in
orientation
sexual
of
subject
the
According to Chapter 43's advocates, the latter argument posed by the
Traditional Values Coalition is supported by flawed reasoning. 16 In response to the
Coalition's statement that homosexual jurors have a predetermined view regarding
sexual orientation, Assemblymember Carole Migden points out that under this
reasoning "a[n] African American male would have to be excluded from the Rodney
King jury."' 1 7 As the Garcia court explained, there is no correlation between
homosexuality and individual viewpoint. 18 Otherwise, the same argument could be
made that heterosexuals are equally unfit to serve on juries where one of the parties
is also heterosexual. " 9 If courts followed the Coalition's reasoning on this issue, the

App. 4th at 1279,92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346 (indicating that jury service is a community right); Marder, supra note 101,
at 1046 (same); Birdlebough Letter, supra note 101, at 1 (same); Benbrook Letter, supra note 101, at I (same);
Koonan Letter, supra note 79, at 2 (same).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15 (explaining why the Traditional Values Coalition is opposed
to Chapter 43). But see MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 3 (claiming that the Coalition is opposed to Chapter 43
simply "because they are homophobic").
113. Letter from Rev. Louis P. Sheldon, Chairman, Traditional Values Coalition, to Assemblymember Sheila
Kuehl, at 1 (Apr. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Sheldon Letter] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also
Letter from Helene Schneider, President, Santa Barbara Women's Political Committee, to Senator Jack O'Connell,
at I (May 11, 2000) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (expressing support for Chapter 43 while
simultaneously admitting that the new law "expands lesbian rights").
114. Sheldon Letter, supra note 113, at 1.
115. Id.; see also Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 292, 583 P.2d at 771-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Richardson, J.
dissenting) (indicating that the ideal jury is not necessarily composed of all elements of society in an effort to
balance biases, but rather, "individual prejudices [may] so control the jurors that they are incapable of viewing the
issues before them dispassionately. Such disharmony may make a unanimous verdict an impossibility from the
outset thus rendering the criminal trial a futile exercise"). But see infra text accompanying notes 117-20 (refuting
the Coalition's argument).
116. Infra text accompanying notes 117-20.
117. MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 3.
118. See Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1276, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344 (contending that "[clommonality of
perspective does not result in identity of opinion"); see also Lynd, supra note 5, at 274 (quoting People v. Viggiani,
431 N.Y.S. 2d 979, 982 (1980) claiming that homosexuals are "'as diverse in their opinions as their numbers'");
id. at 256 (arguing that heterosexuals are actually more likely to discriminate against homosexuals than vice versa).
119. Lynd, supra note 5, at 275, 278.
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entire voir dire process would be a fruitless endeavor because each and every citizen
would automatically be presumed unqualified.'
Even if there is some validity to the last argument posed by the Traditional
Values Coalition, Chapter 43's advocates also point out that members of cognizable
groups can still be excused from juries based on actual bias. 121 For example, if a
homosexual prospective juror conveys during voir dire that she cannot be impartial
in a case involving gay issues, then the juror may permissibly be excused from the
jury panel for demonstration of actual bias.' 22 The problem with this argument,
however, is that it fails to recognize that excuses based on actual bias are challenges
for cause rather than peremptories.123 Thus, the argument impliedly acknowledges
that in the absence of evidence indicating that a homosexual prospective juror has
actual bias in a case involving gay issues, Chapter 43 forbids an attorney from using
a peremptory challenge to excuse such a juror, unless the lawyer is able to state an
acceptable reason for believing the juror is biased. 124 As a result, parties may be
forced to retain unwanted and possibly biased jurors on a jury panel. 25
C. Possible Consequences of Limiting Peremptory Challenges
Arguments opposed to limiting the use of peremptory challenges emphasize that
such practice could produce dangerous results. 26 Opponents contend that lawyers
may be less inclined to excuse jurors believed to be biased simply out of fear of
being unable to explain a reason for the challenge. 2 7 Even worse, if a lawyer
unsuccessfully tried to remove such a juror, and the juror sought to be excused is
made aware of that attempt, the juror is much less likely to be sympathetic to the
challenging lawyer's case. 12 8 In either predicament, the result could be particularly

120. Id.
121. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2418, at 6 (June 7, 2000).
122. Id.
123. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 225 (West Supp. 2000) (indicating that there are three types of challenges
for cause: general disqualification, implied bias, and actual bias) (emphasis added); see also Lynd, supra note 5,
at 273 (demonstrating one court's "for cause" removal of jurors who claimed they could not be impartial to a
homosexual victim).
124. See Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1282, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348-49 (requiring, upon remand, that the
prosecutor explain his peremptory challenges to the court in order to determine their validity); see also supra note
72-76 (indicating that Chapter 43, in part, codifies the Garciadecision).
125. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that lawyers may have to allow
biased jurors to be seated on jury panels because of counsel's inability to provide an adequate reason for excusing
the juror).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 127-31 (explaining the dangerous results that may occur).
127. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that forcing attorneys to express
reasons for peremptorily excusing a prospective juror from service is potentially problematic because lawyers
sometimes base peremptory challenges on "experienced hunches and educated guesses"); see also Marder, supra
note 101, at 1086 (same).
128. See J.EB., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that some courts exercise peremptory
challenges in open-court, where prospective jurors can witness the proceedings).
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damaging to a criminal defendant.' 29 Opponents also point out that, in geographic
areas where a cognizable group is particularly prevalent, it could simply be
coincidental if members of the group are peremptorily excused. 30 In this scenario,
group bias may indeed have nothing to do with the decision to excuse a particular
juror. However, if the excusing attorney is unable to explain an appropriate reason
for dismissal, a criminal defendant rightfully convicted could have her case
overturned simply because a member of a cognizable group was excused from ajury
panel. 131
Opponents of limiting the peremptory challenge also argue that having to
specify a reason for excusing a member of a cognizable group defeats the entire
purpose of the challenge. 132 This is because peremptories, by definition, do not
require attorneys to specify reasons for excusing a prospective juror. 13 3 Thus,
opponents contend that by requiring attorneys to disclose reasons for dismissal, "we
make the3 4 peremptory challenge less discretionary and more like a challenge for
cause." 1
On the other hand, even though Chapter 43 limits an attorney's use of
peremptory challenges,135 some commentators argue that lawyers cannot accurately
predict how prospective jurors will rule on a given case anyway, 136 so any harm is
minimal at most. 137 For example, in demonstrating an array of thoughts that may

129. See id. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that "[t]he loss of the real peremptory will be felt most
keenly by the criminal defendant").
130. See Lynd, supra note 5, at 249 (describing the high odds of having many homosexuals in a San Francisco
jury pool).
131. See, e.g., Garcia,77 Cal. App. 4th at 1282, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349 (indicating that upon remand to the
trial court, if the excusing attorney is unable to articulate acceptable reasons for excusing two lesbian women
removed from the jury panel, Cano Garcia is entitled to a new trial); see also Richard Marosi, State Court Rules
Jurors Can'tBe Excludedfor Sexual Orientation, L.A. TIMES, Feb.2, 2000, at A3 (claiming that such a limitation
on peremptory challenges can create new grounds for appeals for defendants rightfully convicted of crimes).
132. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161-62 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that "the peremptory challenge
system.., loses its whole character when (in order to defend against 'impermissible stereotyping' claims) 'reasons'
for strikes must be given").
133. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (defining peremptory challenges).
134. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 111 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (failing to mention any disagreement with the majority's opinion that peremptory challenges are not
undermined by requiring reasons to be stated in their exercise against African-American jurors); id. at 98-99
(indicating the majority's view that peremptories are not undermined by the court's decision).
135. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.5 (enacted by Chapter 43).
136. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 139 (asserting that "[v]irtually every important study done in this area...
has demonstrated that lawyers, and even their highly paid jury consultants, are no better at detecting hidden juror
bias than a monkey throwing a dart"); see also Marder, supra note 101, at 1080 (claiming that studies show that
lawyers are not accurate predictors of jury bias).
137. Marder, supra note 101, at 1124 (declaring that with each restriction that is added to the use of
peremptory challenges, "we believe that we have 'solved' the problem of ... discrimination during jury selection
even though all we have done is to limit the way in which it can be discussed").
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enter an attorney's mind when trying to determine how to exercise peremptory
challenges, Judge Morris Hoffman explained:
[p]eremptory challenges are a combination of psychiatry and palm reading,
which probably overlap greatly .... We just love to judge people, and we

love to predict the unpredictable. "You're fair; you're not. You think you
are so smart trying to hide your bias, but I detected it. You're with us;
you're against us. You're a sniveling liberal panty waist who will award any
sad-eyed claimant a million dollars per tear; you're a hard-hearted
conservative who wouldn't throw his own mom a life preserver.'
In furtherance of this view, a 1991 study shows that "on average, attorneys guessed
that they had correctly predicted jurors' verdicts for 71.9% of the jurors they had
examined," when, in fact, they were correct only 45.4% of the time. 3 9
D. Will Chapter43 Really ChangeAnything?
1. Attorneys May Still be Able to Remove Unwanted Jurorsfrom Jury
Panels Despite Chapter43
Chapter 43 may fail to be effective in changing the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges because even though courts will likely prevent attorneys
from directly asking whether a juror is gay, attorneys still have ways of acquiring
the information; and, therefore, excluding the juror because of it.140 For example,
attorneys can formulate questions designed to elicit responses from prospective
jurors indicating membership in an "undesirable" group.'14 If an attorney desires to
exclude homosexuals from the jury venire, she can permissibly ask questions
regarding who a juror lives with, 42 whether or not the juror has supported any gay
rights causes, 143 or whether the juror has any gay friends.' Furthermore, in the
course of voir dire questioning, the juror could inadvertently offer information as to
his homosexuality. 14If a juror was excused based on his admission or response to

138.
139.
Publicity:
140.
141.

Hoffman, supra note 2, at 140.
Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with PrejudicialPretrial
An EmpiricalStudy, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 689 (1991).
Infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
Infra text accompanying notes 142-49.

142. See State Won't Appeal Ban on Removing Gay Jurors,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2000, at A20 (pointing out
that attorneys can evade the peremptory challenge ban by inquiring about a prospective juror's living partners);
Harriet Chiang, Ruling ProtectsGay JurorRights/DismissalsCan'tBe Based on Sexual Orientation,State Court
Says, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2000, at Al (same); Lynd, supra note 5, at 247 (same).
143. Lynd, supra note 5, at 247.
144. Id.

145. See id. (stating that a juror in the Dan White trial admitted to being gay when asked if he had any gay
friends).
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any of these types of questions, the attorney could provide a pretextual reason for
excusing the juror. 146 Even absurd reasons, such as explaining to the court that "the
juror resembles [my] stupid Uncle Cletus,"' 147 or
that the juror is a "wide-eyed
49
148
strikes.1
peremptory
permissible
[blonde]" are
On the other hand, Chapter 43 may motivate courts to bar attorneys from asking
the above ttypess0of questions, thereby decreasing the likelihood of discrimination
injury selection. As the Garcia court noted, "[n]o one should be 'outed' in order to
take part in the civic enterprise which is jury duty. The whole point is that no one
can be excluded because of sexual orientation. That being the case, no one should
be allowed to inquire about it."'' Even though this statement specifically bans direct
questioning of a person's sexual orientation, it also arguably supports the notion that
questions regarding whether a juror supports gay rights causes or has gay friends
impliedly solicit a response from a juror as to her own sexual orientation and,
52
therefore, should be impermissible. 1
2. Chapter43's Failureto Specify a Remedy Could Be Problematic
Because Chapter 43 fails to provide a specific remedy upon finding that an
attorney has improperly excused a prospective juror from service, 153 inconsistent
results may surface 154 when courts attempt to resolve the issue through the
application of case law.155 For example, if a court applies the Wheeler remedy, both
the inappropriately dismissed juror and the entire jury panel are excused, beginning
jury selection anew. 156 This remedy is problematic because dismissing the entire
venire prolongs jury selection procedures, inevitably compiling higher financial

146. See Marder,supra note 101, at 1123-24 (claiming that attorneys may alter their reasons for peremptorily
excusing a juror based on which reasons courts deem acceptable); see also Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 293, 583 P.2d
at 772, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Richardson, J. dissenting) (arguing that questioning an attorney as to why she excused
a prospective juror is a fruitless endeavor because pretextual reasons are easy to provide).
147. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1280, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
148. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See id. (noting that the majority opinion fails to explain what types of reasons for peremptorily excusing
ajuror are valid and acceptable).
150. See Lynd, supra note 5, at 247 (discussing the Dan White trial and noting that the judge allowed defense
counsel to ask these exact questions during voir dire).
151. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1280, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
152. See id. (suggesting that inquiry designed to discover a person's sexual orientation is impermissible).
153. See supra text accompanying note 93 (noting that Chapter 43 does not provide a specific remedy for
improper dismissal of jurors).
154. See supra note 94 (explaining that Batson and Wheeler do not necessarily provide the same remedy).
155. See supra text accompanying note 94 (explaining that courts are expected to follow case law to
determine the appropriate remedy).
156. See supra note 94 (noting that Wheeler has been interpreted to indicate that the entire jury panel must
be dismissed upon discovery of a juror who has been improperly excused).
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costs to the litigants as well as the general public.1 57 The Batson Court, however, did
not indicate a preference for a specific remedy, but did point out the possibility of
following the remedy set out in Wheeler by simply seating the inappropriately
excused juror.1 58 Even though the Legislature may have intended courts to follow
the latter remedy, 59 the failure to specify such an intent essentially undermines the
entire purpose behind codifying the cases leading up to Chapter 43's creation160 in
the first place.' 6' This is because the Legislature claims to have codified Chapter 4362
in an attempt to give guidance to courts who were inadequately applying case law. 1
That being the argument, the Legislature ironically presumes that California courts
will adequately follow either of the remedies
noted by the Batson decision, once
63
inappropriate juror dismissal is discovered.1
V. CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether practitioners agree with Chapter 43's provisions, one
64
cannot overlook the fact that the new law was designed with good intentions.t
Because the homosexual community and other cognizable groups have suffered the
consequences of discriminatory jury selection procedures in California for several
years, 165 Chapter 43 is an admirable 66attempt to stop such group bias from infecting
courtroom procedure in the future.
However, despite the legislative intent underlying its enactment, Chapter 43 was
not universally celebrated among the new law's commentators. 167 Supporters
contend that Chapter 43 makes California statutory law consistent with

157. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 288,583 P.2d at 769, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (1978) (Richardson, J. dissenting)
(contending that the provided remedy makes "the present lengthy process of voir dire ... lengthier still"); see also
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (suggesting that requiring attorneys to explain their reasons for
peremptories in the first place already prolongs jury selection procedures); id. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
158. See supra note 94 (explaining that Batson case specifically declined to specify a preferred remedy in its
holding, but noting that Batson has been construed to mean that the inappropriately excused juror may be seated).
159. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts should be seating the juror, rather than
excusing the entire panel).
160. See supra note 72 (stating that Chapter 43 codifies Wheeler, Batson, and all of the other cases leading
up to the Garcia decision).
161. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (indicating that Chapter 43 is an attempt to give legislative
guidance because California courts in the past have inadequately followed the law under the Batson decision with
respect to improper peremptory strikes).
162. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
163. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204 (amended by Chapter 43) (failing to specify a remedy for courts to
follow upon discovery of an inappropriately dismissed juror); id. § 231.5 (enacted by Chapter 43) (same); see also
MIGDEN Q & A, supra note 13, at 3 (suggesting that the Legislature intended to rely on case law with respect to the
remedy for improper juror dismissal).
164. See supra text accompanying note 79 (asserting that Chapter 43 was enacted to eliminate discriminatory
jury selection procedures).
165. Supra text accompanying note 10.
166. Supra text accompanying note 79.
167. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the opposing concerns to Chapter 43); see also supra Part IV.B (same).
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constitutional provisions. 168 Advocates further argue that Chapter 43 simultaneously
attempts to eliminate group bias committed against cognizable groups.' 69 Opponents,
on the other hand, dispute these asserted benefits, claiming that Chapter 43
prioritizes a juror's right to serve on a jury panel over a defendant's right to a fair
trial. 170 Furthermore, opponents claim that if a trial involves gay issues, homosexual
jurors will have predetermined views, rendering them incapable of bein
gimpartial.' 7 ' Chapter 43's adversaries further maintain that the new law undermines
the essence of the preemptory challenge by further limiting its use; 7 2 and that
attorneys should have the right to excuse any unwanted juror from a jury venire.173
Ironically, much of the debate surrounding Chapter 43's enactment may
ultimately prove pointless because the new law will likely fail to serve its purported
goals. 174 Attorneys may still remove unwanted prospective jurors from jury panels
simply by asking certain questions, 175 or by explaining their peremptory strikes with
pretextual reasons.176 Furthermore, the Legislature's omission of a specific remedy
for courts to follow upon discovery of an improperly excused juror still leaves
177
California courts with uncertainty as to the proper procedure to follow thereafter.
In sum, although there is a respectable sentiment underlying Chapter 43's
creation, 78 the Legislature missed its opportunity to ensure that the new law would
79
be followed as designed, by failing to codify its intent.

168. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that Chapter 43 addresses fair-cross section as well as equal protection
concerns).
169. Supra Part IV.A.
170. Supra text accompanying note 111.
171. Supra Part IV.B.
172. See supra Part IV.C (claiming that peremptory challenges, by definition, do not require attorneys to state
a reason for excusing ajuror, so Chapter 43 should not place limits on how peremptory challenges should be used).
173. Supra Part IV.B.
174. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (claiming that one of Chapter 43's goals was to provide
guidance to courts); see also supra text accompanying note 79 (contending that Chapter 43 was also enacted to
eliminate discriminatory jury selection procedures).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44 (noting that attorneys can ask prospectivejurors whether they
have any gay friends, whether they have supported any gay rights causes, or who they live with).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49 (providing examples ofpretextual reasons attorneys can give
and still be allowed to excuse a prospective juror).
177. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining that Chapter 43 requires courts to apply case law
rather than setting out a specific remedy).
178. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (claiming that Chapter 43 was partly enacted to provide
guidance to courts); see also supra text accompanying note 79 (explaining that Chapter 43 was also enacted to
prevent future discrimination in jury selection).
179. See supra text accompanying note 95 (explaining that the Legislature likely intended the remedy for
violating Chapter 43 to be that the improperly excused juror should be seated).

